University of North Florida

UNF Digital Commons
UNF Graduate Theses and Dissertations

Student Scholarship

1999

Deception in Interpersonal Settings: The Relationship Between the
Content of an Excuse and its Recipient
Vera Margaret Trefry
University of North Florida

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/etd
Part of the Psychology Commons

Suggested Citation
Trefry, Vera Margaret, "Deception in Interpersonal Settings: The Relationship Between the Content of an
Excuse and its Recipient" (1999). UNF Graduate Theses and Dissertations. 122.
https://digitalcommons.unf.edu/etd/122

This Master's Thesis is brought to you for free and open
access by the Student Scholarship at UNF Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in UNF
Graduate Theses and Dissertations by an authorized
administrator of UNF Digital Commons. For more
information, please contact Digital Projects.
© 1999 All Rights Reserved

DECEPTION IN INTERPERSONAL SETTINGS:
THE RELATIONSIDP BETWEEN THE CONTENT
OF AN EXCUSE AND ITS RECIPIENT

by
Vera Margaret Trefry

A thesis submitted to the Department of Psychology

in partial fulfillment ofthe requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in General Psychology
UNIVERSITY OF NORTH FLORIDA
COLLEGE OF ARTS AND SCIENCES
April, 1999
Unpublished work c Vera Margaret Trefry

CERTIFICATE OF APPROVAL PAGE

The thesis of Vera Margaret Trefry is approved:

(Date)

Signature Deleted

Signature Deleted

Accepted for the Department:

Signature Deleted

Accepted for the College:

Signature Deleted

Accepted for the University:

Signature Deleted

7

Dean of Graduate Students

! l)

iii

Dedication

This thesis is dedicated to my husband,
Bruce Trefry.
Without his support, it would not have been possible.

iv
Table of Contents
Dedication....................... .................................... ............................................

iii

Abstract...........................................................................................................

v

Introduction................................................ ....................... ..............................

1

Detection of Deception in Interpersonal Settings...........................................

2

How easy is it to detect deception in others?.....................................

3

Suspicion states..................... ..................... ................................. ........

6

Information availability................. .................................................. ....

7

Integrative encoding.......... ................. ...... ................ ....... ............. .......

8

Social Implications of Deception of Excuses in Interpersonal Settings..........

9

Method............................................................................................................

16

Subjects.............................................................................................. ,

16

Procedure.. ............................................. ...............................................

18

Criterion.... .......... .......... .................... .................... .......... .................. ...

20

Predictor...............................................................................................

21

Ancillary variables.......... ............................................. ...... ................ ...

22

Results.............................................................................................................

23

Reliability of coding........................ .......... ..................... ....... ...............

23

Missing data.............. ...... .... .......... ......................................................

23

Subject characteristics: self monitoring and age................ ..................

24

Other analyses............... .... ......... ... ...... .............. ..... .............. .... ... ........

38

Conclusion............. ...... ............................. .... ..................... ................. .... .........

49

Strengths of the study.........................................................................

52

Limitations of the study.......................................................................

54

Appendices....................... ............................... .................................................

56

References........ ................................................................................................

60

Curriculum Vitae............................................... ...............................................

64

v
Abstract
A correlational study investigated the nature of excuses, including the relationship
of excuse complexity, uniqueness, frequency, and success to the level of knowledge the
recipient has about the excuse giver. Analysis of results from responses of 121 participants
to questionnaires describing excuses to employers, teachers, parents, and
spouselboy/girlfriends found that the complexity and uniqueness of excuses vary positively
with the knowledge level of the recipient, but only when an unequal power relationship
exists between the recipient and the excuse giver. Excuses to recipients with a low
personal knowledge level of the excuse giver, such as employers or teachers, tended to be
simple in nature, contained a minimum amount of information, and were usually common
and frequently occurring. In contrast, excuses to recipients with a high personal
knowledge ofthe excuse giver, such as parents who lived with the participants, tended to
be complex in nature, contained significantly larger amounts of information, were
generally more specific to the excuse giver and less frequently occurring. Old excuses
were used more than new excuses in all contexts. Previously used excuses were also more
frequent in low or neutral confidence conditions, and were more likely to be successful.
Excuses were more successful to employers or teachers than to parents or spouselboy
girlfriends. Different categories emerged for different recipients of the excuses: the illness
category was used most in the work context, and the miscellaneous category was used
most in the parent and spouselboy/girlfriend contexts. The influence of external control,
and short and long term intimacy factors on the nature of excuses was discussed.
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Deception in Interpersonal Settings: The Relationship between the Content
of an Excuse and Its Recipient
Excuse making, when used as an untrue tactical communication, has been
described as a special form of deception (Weiner, 1995). A less pejorative viewpoint
suggests excuse making is "a way of living with our human flaws" (Snyder, Higgins &
Stucky, 1983, p.1). The behavior may also be considered either chronic or acute. It is
described in such ancient religious manuscripts of human morality and behavior as The
Bible and early church writings of Sainte Augustine. Further, inasmuch as excuses (as lies)
have widespread everyday use (e.g., Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 1984), the phenomenon
presupposes both a purposeful goal and a continuing successful human interactive
behavior. According to Camden et al., the ethics of "social" white lies have remained
largely unconsidered, but their frequency gives credence to the argument that they are
common, justifiable, and often the preferred communication strategy as the most efficient
solution to interpersonal communication problems (Knapp & Comadena, 1979).
Excuses and self-deceptions have been associated with a variety of performance
task advantage outcomes and improved physiological measures and psychological health
(Snyder & Higgins, 1988). The large body of work ofC.R. Snyder on deception
emphasizes the importance of attributional styles in excuse making, and identifies the
external, variable, unstable, and specific rather than global pattern of attribution to be the
prototypical excuse making pattern. He defines excuses for deception as "the motivated
process of shifting causal attributions for negative personal outcomes from sources that
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are relatively more central to the person's sense of self to sources that are relatively less
central, thereby resulting in perceived benefits to the person's image and sense of control"
(Snyder & Higgins, 1988, p.23). Snyder suggests the excuse giver (deceiver) undergoes
subjective analysis of one or more attributional strategies for distancing himlherself from a
negative outcome. In this paper I will attempt to identify the variables related to
deception in explaining the strategies of the excuse giver, as well as investigate possible
relationships associated with the choice (content) and the recipient (context) of the
excuses.
Detection of Deception in Interpersonal Settings
A common theme found in past and more recent reviews of the extensive literature
covering verbal deception concerns how many of the experimental strategies and
procedures have been used for impersonal rather than interpersonal relationships (Knapp
& Comadena, 1979; Kraut, 1980; Miller, Mongeau, & Sleight, 1986; Zucherman,
DePaulo, & Rosenthal, 1981). In addition, approaches in experimental studies often focus
on variables (such as verbal and physical) associated with the deceiver rather than with the
receiver/recipient (DePaulo, Zuckerman, & Rosenthal, 1980; Knapp & Comadena, 1979).
The roles of the deceiver and that of the recipient of the deception are customarily treated
separately in the experimental setting, with the actors mostly unknown to each other
(Burgoon, Buller, Floyd & Grandpre, 1996; Brandt, Miller & Hocking, 1980; Miller et al.,
1986), and having little concern for results of the deceptive behavior (Miller et al. 1986;
Stiff & Miller, 1986). In this way, consideration of the dynamic relationship between
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participants and the complexity of human interaction and motivation is neglected (Knapp
& Comadena, 1979; McCornack & Parks, 1986). Additionally, empirical studies are likely

to be confounded by demand characteristics and lack of mundane realism (Knapp &
Comadena, 1979; Stiff & Miller, 1996). As Burgoon et al. (1996, p.726) note,
"deception is not a one-way activity, and both sender and receiver actively participate in
constructing the deceptive communication."
In a review of representativeness of language and cognition, Miller posited that
effective communication of information requires sufficient knowledge of the recipient by
the speaker, while the recipient "must attribute certain intentions to the source" (Miller,
1990, p.12); i.e., the recipient assumes the message to be truthful and there is no
intention to deceive on the part of the sender. It would appear that successful verbal
deceptions (lies), a special form of communication, would also follow this maxim, but
where attnbutions of intentions to the source are inaccurate (i.e., the recipient has no
knowledge of the true intentions of the source). The following sections will attempt to
integrate findings identifying variables associated with deception, particularly as they relate
to relationships (familiarity) between participants.
How Easv Is It to Detect Deception in Others?
Experiments continue to converge on results that show that detection of deception
(i.. e., accurate attribution of source intention) in naive observers is only a little better than
chance (e.g., Burgoon et al., 1996; Knapp & Comadena, 1979; Stiff & Miller, 1986). A
metaanalysis of results of seven experimental studies measuring verbal behavior directly
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showed that judgment of deceptive verbal communication was not a reliable cue for
deception detection (Q> .20) (Kraut, 1980). These results are in contrast to the
metaanalysis of DePaulo, Zucherman, and Rosenthal (1980), in which they report that 12
of 14 studies showed judges' accuracy to be significantly better than chance. A more
recent demonstration using a classroom rather than an experimental laboratory setting
supported Kraut's finding (Desforges & Lee, 1995). Students were fairly poor at
correctly identifYing when classmates were telling the truth or lying, when perceived
physical deception cues (such as eye contact, posture shifts) or natural poses were
randomly assigned to the truthful or lying video sessions of their classmates. In effect, the
students had concentrated on the wrong aspects of the communication. Another student
study, however, suggested that people were suspicious of the truthfulness of casual
conversation recalled over several previous days' encounters (Schul, Burnstein, & Bardi,
1996). In none of these studies was the relationship of the speaker to the recipient (mostly
strangers) taken into account. Strangers were also used as senders and recipients in an
experiment by Stiff and Miller (1986), but an interaction relationship was manipulated
between them by exposing senders to positive or negative interrogative probes on the part
of recipients. Perceived nonverbal cues for detection of deception, such as blinks, smiles,
and posture shifts, were again unrelated to actual deception.
Elaborating on their work on interactive deception studies, Burgoon et al. (1996)
explain the poor prediction in naive observers in terms oftheir interpersonal deception
theory. The fundamental assumption is that both sender and receiver participate in the
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deceptive interaction, and that their goals, motives, and perceptions of their own and each
others' behavior is discrepant. The demands of interaction increase the cognitive load for
receivers, leading them to selectively make heuristic judgments to confirm initial
impressions, often resulting in misleading perceptions.
Improvement of accuracy of detection has been found in studies manipulating
familiarity with the target's truthful behavior. Brandt, Miller, and Hocking (1982) found a
positive effect for familiarity in observers shown a videotape ofthe target's truthful
behavior compared to observers who had not seen the videotape. But in a similar design
(Brandt, Miller & Hocking, 1980), the authors found increased accuracy injudgment
across three conditions increasing in familiarity exposures, but a decrease to baseline
accuracy (comparable to the accuracy of observers who had not seen the truthful behavior
videotape) following the highest familiarity condition. The results suggest that, beyond a
certain point of exposure to the target's truthful behavior, the observer's accuracy in
detection decreases.
Studies that have used participants with extant relationships to the target/sender
have shown an increase in deception detection accuracy with degree of relationship. In a
correlational study, Comadena (1982) showed spouses to be more accurate than friends in
detection, and female spouses to be significantly more accurate than male spouses.
However, McCornack and Parks (1986) found that the greater the level of relational
development, the greater was the increase in truth bias (the belief that partners are telling
the truth). In turn, as the truth bias increased, the level of detection of deception accuracy
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decreased. The deception studies appear to suggest that familiarity of the deceiver by the
recipient, especially that produced by relationships, is a significant variable in detection
accuracy, and that a nonlinear relationship may exist between relationship (familiarity) and
detection of deception accuracy.
Suspicion States
Although DePaulo et al. (1980) showed that a state of suspicion on the part of the
recipient facilitated detection of deception, other studies examining the effects of
suspicion states on detection have had inconsistent results with unrelated partners (Toris

& DePaulo, 1984), and with related partners (Stiff: Kim & Ramesh, 1989, as cited in
McCornak & Levine, 1990). McCornak and Levine (1990) investigated the relationship
between levels of state induced and trait suspiciousness with accuracy in detection of
deception as the independent variables, and found improved probabilities of deception
detection. Building on their previous research that truth bias exists between those in
close relationships such as the participants in their study, and that sufficiently aroused
state suspicion will cause truth bias to be abandoned, the authors hypothesized that
moderately high levels of suspicion should increase deception detection. Very high
levels of state suspicion were hypothesized to develop lie bias and to decrease accuracy
of deception, while low levels of suspicion would not destroy truth bias and would
again result in a decrease in accuracy of deception. The factorial design of their study
included two levels of trait suspiciousness, identified by dichotomizing scores on a self
report measure of a generalized communicative suspicions scale, and three levels of state
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suspicion, obtained through different information given to participants in each of the
experimental conditions. The results of their study were as they predicted and indicated a
curvilinear relationship between suspicion states and detection accuracy.
Information Availability
Bauchner, Brandt, and Miller's (1977) study investigated whether increases in
available sensory information (verbal and nonverbal) from the sender increased detection
accuracy of the recipient. Observers in the highest information condition had the highest
accuracy rate of deception detection, but results did not achieve probabilities significantly
different from chance. However, investigation of effects of information restriction
between related and unrelated partners has been successful in establishing an interaction
between familiarity and information levels for deception detection (Millar & Millar, 1995).
The authors based their reasoning on the selective processing hypothesis, which suggests
that as familiar persons are associated with greater amounts of information than strangers,
detecting a familiar person's deception may cause the recipient to selectively or
heuristically resort to simple decision rules (e.g., representativeness) when confronted by
complex information instead of considering relevant information (Kahnenmen & Tversky,
1994). In two separate experiments, Millar and Millar (1995) manipulated the amount of
information to recipients from truthful or untruthful, and familiar or unfamiliar senders.
The recipients experienced a restriction in audio information in one half of the trials in the
first experiment, and a restriction in video information in one half of the trials in the
second experiment. Results significantly confirmed the authors' hypothesis: with more
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information, recipients were more accurate in detecting deception in strangers; with less
information, recipients were more accurate in detecting deception in familiar people.
Integrative Encoding
The work of Schul and collaborators on theoretical cognitive strategies involving
integrative encoding and suspicion states helps to explain the results of research
identifying a nonlinear relationship between familiarity and detection, and the
interaction between levels of information and familiarity of the Millar and Millar studies
(Schul, 1993; Schul, Burnstein, & Bardi, 1996). The collective results of Schul et al.
contribute to the theory of the variability of deception accuracy with elaboration of
encoding for suspicious and unsuspicious recipients. Schul posits that the cognitive
activity for suspicious recipients may differ from recipients who are not suspicious,
because they engage in more elaborate encoding to prepare to cope with invalid (Le.,
deceitful) information. Schul's findings demonstrated that although (a) suspicious
recipients could prepare to encode (and discard) invalid information more successfully
than unsuspicious recipients, (b) some recipients would have greater difficulty discounting
invalid information to the degree that it has been integrated with valid reports, in which
case integrative encoding may impair deception detection. Situation (a) would be
represented by the case of the suspicious stranger in the Millar and Millar study who has a
single representation or schemata of the sender, and situation (b) would be represented by
the case ofthe suspicious relative who would have muhiple schemata ofthe sender
because of an already existing rich base of information (i.e., valid reports).
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Summarizing the evidence from the cited studies thus far, it can be reasoned that
successful verbal deceptions would need to include absence of knowledge of intentions of
the sender on the part of the recipient. Nonsuspicious states would infer absence of
counter-scenarios and elaborative encoding, and validate reliability of the source
information from sender; thus, communication of deception would be accepted. Apart
from disguising true intentions, the sender would need to ensure control of the amount of
information, the degree of which would be different depending on the sender's knowledge
of the recipient. This has been shown to be correlated to the relationship of the recipient
to the sender. Thus, a successful lie to a stranger would involve minimal information. A
successful lie to a recipient familiar to the sender would need a more elaborate message.
As informative as it is, the mechanics of deception--how it works and under what

conditions--does not address the "why" of deception. Neither can it directly examine
underlying motivations and goals, which would seem a central focus of understanding the
excuses-as-lies phenomenon. Instead, the mechanics of detection as identified here may be
considered a useful tool in the further investigation of the social implications of deception
of excuses.
Social Implications of Deception of Excuses in Interpersonal Settings
The focus of research on the social implications of deception rather than detection
of excuses has varied widely . The scope of investigations has included the reasons for
lying (Turner, Edgley, & Olmstead, 1975), the effects oflying (Hample, 1980), the goals
and motivations underlying the deceptions (Camden, Motley, & Wilson, 1984; Weiner,
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Figueroa-Munoz, & Kakiharo, 1991), relation of the attribution theory to excuses
(Weiner, 1995), lies and impression management (Hample, 1980; Stiff & Miller, 1986),
the content of the lies (what they are about), and their context (the situation and recipients
of the excuse) (Lippard, 1988; Weiner et al., 1991).
The analysis of social motivations for excuses as lies, which concerns the nature
and the function ofthe deceptions, had a beginning in the studies of Turner et al. (1975),
who analyzed student subjects' statements made in natural conversation. A total of 61 % of
statements were rated dishonest by the subjects themselves. They identified five
motivations for lying, in order of prevalence: to save face (55%), to avoid tension or
conflict (22%), to guide social interactions (9%), to affect interpersonal relationships
(9%), and to achieve interpersonal power (3%). The authors concluded that nonintimate
relationships involved more distortions of truth than primary relationships, and that lies
were common and socially acceptable.
Hample (1980) replicated the Turner et al. findings that lies were common. In a
correlational study examining undergraduate descriptions of lies from 13 interviews and 39
questionnaires, Hample identified motivations as benefiting self, benefiting others, or
benefiting a relationship. The author concluded lies are motivated by a need for social or
economical defense in a disadvantaged situation, are often used to cope with difficulties in
unequal power relationships, and were also often considered the only communication
alternatives in a situation Three quarters of the subjects described situations that were
near replications of previous ones in which lies had been used, and reported twice as many
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lies to superiors as peers. Hample analyzed most lies to be automatic and repeated, and
responsive rather than initiating.
Camden, Motley and Wilson (1984) expanded the categories of the studies of
Hample and Turner et al. in refining the development ofa social lie (content) category and
a social motivation category. The authors noted 75% of lies benefited the liar, but
suggested the possibility of mixed or more than one motive for a lie, such that at some
level the liar is the eventual beneficiary (e.g., benefiting self esteem of the other improves
how the other perceives the liar, and is really protecting the relationship). The authors
found a greater reliance by women on the use of white lies to satisfy affiliation needs, and
that women were more likely than men to use lies to protect self esteem.
Building on the findings of Camden et al. (1984), Lippard (1988) focussed on the
refinement of their major reward category system of basic needs, affiliation, and self
esteem. Her objectives were to expand the identification of the recipient role and to
examine the relationship between motivation and recipient categories. In a three-week
period, 74 undergraduate students recorded all instances of deception, including a
description of the situation of deception, the recipient's age, gender, and relationship and
degree of intimacy to the subject, the perceived consequences for the excuse, including
whether believed or not, and the imagined consequence for revealing the truth. She
reported 85% of recipients of deception in her study were in relationship or affiliation
areas (friends, acquaintances, roommates, parents, spouse, sibling, child, stranger)
and 15% in achievement areas of school or work (employer or teacher). Lippard agreed
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with Hample that the individuals deceived most frequently were parents and powerful
others (teachers/employers). The author identified power and gender as variables
affecting lying behavior, and hypothesized that a different pattern of deception might
emerge for middle age subjects, rather than the very young adults of the study who might
be seen as still seeking identity.
The work of Snyder (1987) similarly suggests that the self monitoring trait may
emerge as a significant variable for excuse studies. In describing self monitoring as a
unique psychological construct, Snyder identified different traits and behaviors in people
categorized as high or low self monitors. High self monitors are defined as those
"particularly sensitive to situational appropriateness of ... social behavior and who use
these cues as guidelines for regulating and controlling expressive behavior" (p.14), which
is ''not necessarily congruent with private attitudes and feelings" (p.IS). On the other

hand, low self monitors are "less attentive to social conformation about
situational-appropriate expressed behavior" and do not ''possess a highly developed
repertoire of self-presentational skills" (p.1S). He reports evidence that high self monitors
"exploit their self presentational skills to successfully deceive others in a variety of
interpersonal contexts," and they possess an ability to "look someone in the eye and tell a
lie with a straight face" (p.22). Such traits suggest high self monitors as compared to low
self monitors may have a larger repertoire of more complex excuses from their more
numerous self-presentation skills within a greater variety of situations.
The work of Weiner and collaborators (Weiner, 1995; Weiner, Amirkhan, Folkes,
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& Verette, 1989; Weiner, Figueroa-Munoz, & Kakiharo, 1991) also categorized excuses
as made in either affiliation (65%) or achievement (work or school) settings. They
classified nine content categories of the excuses (those involving parents, friends, illness,
other commitment, transportation, work/study, forget/negligence, intent, and
miscellaneous). The results show virtually all withheld (true) causes were internal and
controllable, and that excuses (lies) were almost all external, uncontrollable, and mostly
unstable. The authors concluded that the function of excuses was to decrease inferences
of personal responsibility, which they considered the necessary condition for excuse goals
to be met.
A more basic requirement for excuse goals to be met, however, might be the
question, "Can they be believed?" This consideration keeps in mind the essential nature of
excuses that they are untrue statements. The previously examined studies on the
mechanics of deception suggest that the success of an excuse (whether it is believed)
depends on both the amount of information contained in the lie and the knowledge the
recipient of the excuse has about the excuse giver. Using this information, my focus in
this present study will be to test (a) the relationship between the complexity of an excuse
and the knowledge level associated with different recipients or contexts; to test the
relationship of the nature of an excuse to the recipient depending on (b) the degree of
uniqueness (specificity plus temporal probability) of an excuse or (c) whether it has been
used previously or formulated especially for the occasion; and (d) whether the choice of an
excuse is dependent upon the perception of how well the excuse will succeed, i.e., if data

Deception in Interpersonal Settings 14
support confidence factors for a clear choice (or clear rejection of choice) of an excuse
content within a particular recipient context.
It is hypothesized that there is a relationship between context (recipient area) and
content (situation, place, thing) of the excuse, in that specific categories of excuses would
be used depending upon the recipients of those excuses. The reasoning follows results of
the deception detection studies, such that for success, the deceiver has to manipulate the
content ofhislher excuse to match the optimum situation for deception for that recipient.
Conclusions of the deception studies showed that for an unfamiliar recipient, the
information content would need to be minimal; for a recipient with a close relationship to
the deceiver, the information content would need to remain high. Thus, the amount of
information in excuses would appear to depend on the familiarity of the excuse giver to
the recipient.
Hypothesis 1: The complexitv of an excuse is positively related to the level of
knowledge the recipient of the excuse already possesses about the excuse giver.
It is further hypothesized that high self monitors would offer more complex and
varied excuses. The reasoning follows from Snyder's findings on self monitoring traits that
high self monitors as compared to low self monitors may draw on a greater variety of
experiences resulting from their more numerous self-presentation skills. They would thus
tend to produce a more complex excuse for most situations.
Hypothesis la. The complexity ofan excuse is positively related to self monitoring
scores.

Deception in Interpersonal Settings 15

Second, it is hypothesized that the uniqueness of an excuse, a measure defined as
comprising the specificity (i.e., the degree to which the excuse appears to be specially
chosen for that particular situation rather than a global, general excuse) and temporal
probability (the likelihood of occurrence over time) of an excuse would also be positively
related to the level of knowledge the receiver has about the excuse giver. The reasoning
follows from the likelihood that an excuse that is uncontrollable, global, and relatively
frequently occurring would apply to a majority of people, and would be accepted in a
variety of situations within the achievement (schooVwork) context, where the level of
knowledge of the excuse maker to the recipient is low. For example, the excuse "I was
sick." or "My car wouldn't start," might be used successfully to cut a class, excuse or
delay examination attendance for school situations, and explain job tardiness or
absenteeism in the employment area. The excuses may be successful because they are
real, common, uncontrollable events true to many people some of the time, and because
the amount of knowledge about the excuse maker is insufficient for the recipient to
otherwise know the truth of the situation. On the other hand, such reasoning would
seldom be likely to be successful in the spouse/boy/girlfriend relationship context, where
the level of knowledge of the excuse giver by the recipient is high. Such knowledge
would include an immediate assessment of the truth of such common claims such as "I
was sick" or ''The car wouldn't start" by the excuse giver. Rather, an excuse to a
relationship partner would be more likely to be carefully tailor made by the excuse giver
and specific to the situation, taking into account all the relevant knowledge the recipient is
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likely to have. Thus, the degree of uniqueness of an excuse will depend on who the
recipient is; the more knowledge the recipient has, the more unique the excuse will be.
Hypothesis 2. The uniqueness of an excuse. the degree to which it is attnbuted to
be common and global or specific to that circumstance. is positively related to the level of
knowledge the recipient of the excuse has about the excuse giver.
Third, following the previous three hypotheses, it is further hypothesized that the
likelihood of a previously used excuse being used again in a similar situation depends on
who the recipient of the excuse is. The rational follows reasoning of the previous
hypotheses in that excuses to those in the achievement area (low knowledge level) would
be likely to be simple (Hypothesis 1), global, common and frequently occurring
(Hypothesis 2), as such would be likely to be used successfully again. The recipient may
accept them repeatedly, because the purported events (excuses) do re-occur (e.g., people
can get sick more than once, and cars could break down any time). Suspicion states are
not likely to be aroused, and detection of deception is less likely.
In contrast, excuses in relationship contexts, particularly close relationships which
contain the highest level of recipient knowledge of the excuse giver, are likely to be more
complex (Hypothesis 1), with a relatively higher degree of uniqueness (Hypothesis 2), and
as such are unlikely to be used again. It is suggested that the recipient would be likely to
recall such complex, unique circumstances and be suspicious of the coincidence of a
reoccurrence. Thus:
Hypothesis 3. The frequency of an excuse is negatively related to the knowledge
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level of the recipient.
Last, it is hypothesized that the frequency of an excuse depends on the excuse
maker's perception of the relative efficacy of the excuse, i.e., its power to deceive.
Assuming confidence in the excuse to be synonymous with perceived deception, it follows
that an important criterion of choice by excuse makers would concern their perception of
the probability of the recipient in discovering the truth, i.e., whether old or new excuses
are used depends on the excuse giver's confidence of the efficacy ofthe excuse for a
particular situation. In low confidence situations, there would be more reliance on old
excuses. In high confidence situations, there will be less reliance on old excuses. In other
words, confidence increases risk taking (of new excuses), while lack of confidence
decreases risk taking. Thus:
Hypothesis 4. The frequency of an excuse is negatively related to its perceived
power of deception.
Method
Subjects
A total of 121 people participated in the study. Ninety students, 77 female and 13
male, were volunteers from four undergraduate psychology classes and one graduate
social science statistics class in a small Florida state university. The undergraduate
students received extra credit for taking part in the study. Thirty-one subjects, 18 female
and 13 male, were recruited from the local community from two twelve-step program
groups and by word-of-mouth. The community participants and graduate students were
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volunteers who were not compensated for their participation
Procedure
The psychology undergraduate subjects were introduced to the experimenter in the
laboratory, where the purpose of the study was explained as investigating changes in
communication strategies within important relationship contexts such as school or work,
parents, and spouse/boy/girlfriends. Consent forms (see Appendix A) were distributed,
and were read and completed by the students. The three-page questionnaire and an
18-itemhighllow monitoring scale (see Appendix D) were distributed (Snyder, 1979),
together with a simple demographics information form (for age, sex, student and work
status) (see Appendix C). Before the students completed the questionnaires, the
experimenter again informed the students that the study was voluntary, and no penalty
would be imposed for nonparticipation The questionnaires were reviewed by the
experimenter, and a question and answer period time was allowed for participants to ask
for any clarification.
The community participants and students from the graduate statistics class were
given the same questionnaires, with a modified covering letter (see Appendix B) with the
same explanation of the purpose of the study as given to the undergraduate subjects but
without consent forms enclosed. They were asked to return the completed questionnaires
and forms in the stamped, return address envelope provided and thanked for their
voluntary participation. Anonymity of participants was assured by responses identified
only by a four-digit code.
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Participants read the following instructions (cf Lippard, 1988; Weiner et aI. 1991):
Please think of an occasion concerning your SPOUSE, or a GIRLFRIEND or BOYFRIEND, in which you
gave an excuse that was not the truth. That is, you did something you should not have, or failed to do
something you should have, and you then withheld the real reason for your behavior and gave a different
one. Please describe the circumstances, what you actually said, and the reasons you chose that excuse.
The situation was:

The excuse I gave was:
The reason I chose that particular excuse was (CHECK ALL ITEMS THAT APPLY TO YOUR
EXCUSE)
_ _ _(a). I have used this excuse before in somewhat similar circumstances.
._ _ _{b) It was the kind of excuse that would be accepted easily.
_ _ _(c). It would be very unlikely or impossible for my spouse/boy/girlfriend to find out what really
happened.
_ _ _(d). It was the only suitable excuse I could have used in the circumstances.
_ _ _(e) I have not used this excuse before.

_ _ _(t)o

(other, please specify):

As a result of my giving the excuse,

If you had told the real reason for your action/nonaction, what do you imagine might have been the
consequences?

The same wording was repeated on the other two pages ofthe questionnaire, where the
words "Parents or Guardians" or "Work or School" were substituted for the recipients
(Spouse, or Boyfriend or Girlfriend) given above. The order ofthe pages ofthe
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three-page questionnaire was counter balanced to control for order effects.
The three-page questionnaire was coded as follows:
Excuse content. The excuse content was coded according to whether the excuse
principally used statements concerning the following six categories (cf. Weiner et al.,
1991).

1. parent/relative/friend/other
2. illness
3. other commitment/work/study
4. transportation
5. forget/negligence/no time
6. miscellaneous
Criterion
Hypothesis 1. The criterion variable for Hypothesis I was defined as the total
complexity of the excuse, operationalized by the number of separate pieces of information
contained in the verbal statement comprising the excuse. The complexity was coded as a
continuous variable, with one point recorded for each occurrence of the following: self,
other people, places, psychological and physiological states, events, objects, dates,
measurements, and amounts. One half point was recorded for modifying adverbs or
adjectives.
Hypothesis 2. The criterion variable for Hypothesis 2 was the degree of uniqueness
ofan excuse. The degree of uniqueness, coded as a continuous measure, was
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defined as the sum of the specificity and temporal probability measures. A specific
excuse involved a distinctive event/state caused by a choice or decision by the protagonist,
e.g., "I picked up my manager's grandmother at the airport" (1 point). A nonspecific
excuse involved a common event/state, not caused by the protagonist(s)' choice or
decision, e.g., "The train was late" (0 point). The temporal probability of an excuse was
defined as the true likelihood of the event's occurrence over time: likely daily occurrence,
e.g., traffic conditions (1 point); likely weekly occurrence, e.g., forgetting, negligence (2
points); likely monthly occurrence, e.g., illness (3 points); likely three-monthly
occurrence, e.g., automobile problems (4 points): likely six-monthly occurrence, e.g.,
problems, situations with relatives (5 points); likely annual occurrence, e.g., vandalism of
person/property (6 points).
Hypotheses 3 and 4. The criterion variable for Hypotheses 3 and 4 was defined as
the frequency of the excuse. It was operationalized by the response to item (a) in the
questionnaire that the excuse had been used before (coded 1) or a response to item ( e) in
the questionnaire that the excuse was new (coded 0).
Predictor
Hypotheses 1. 2. and 3. The predictor variable for Hypotheses 1,2, and 3 was
defined as the level of knowledge the recipient has about the excuse giver, and was
operationalized by the degree of intimacy of recipients to excuse givers (cf. Millar &

Millar, 1995): work/school = low knowledge level, parent = medium knowledge level,
spouse/girl!boyfriend = high knowledge level.
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Hypothesis 4. The predictor variable for Hypothesis 4 was defined as the
perceived power of deception of the excuse. It was operationalized by the response to
item (c) of the questionnaire that an excuse was "very unlikely or impossible" to be
exposed as a lie (coded 1) or a nonresponse to item (c) (coded 0).
Ancillarv Variables
Additional variables included a dichotomous "intimacy" variable coded according
to whether the excuse giver lived with (coded 1) or did not live with (coded 0) the
recipient, and was determined from descriptions of the situation, the excuse, and the result
of the excuse; descriptions of two cases were considered to be ambiguous in identifying
living arrangements and were excluded from analysis. A dichotomous "success" variable
was coded according to whether the excuse was successful (coded 1) or unsuccessful
(coded 0), and was determined from the description ofthe excuse result.
Further, for the circumstance described in the questionnaire, an additional variable
was coded 0 or 1 by the coder depending on whether the recipient could or could not have
witnessed the event describing the excuse. This was to provide a convergent validity
comparison for the predictor variable of Hypothesis 4.
It was assumed that having participants identify for themselves the perceived
consequences of the deception would indicate the real reason for the excuse; and asking
them to imagine and describe possible consequences if they had revealed the truth would
point to the purpose for the excuse.
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1.2

Reliability of Coding

Results

The principal experimenter and a graduate student scored questionnaires
independently. The graduate student judge received training in identifYing content
categories, and estimating complexity, specificity, and temporal probability scores. Before
analysis ofthe results, 50 pages were randomly selected from work, spouse, and parent
questionnaires, respectively, and coded by the trained graduate student coder to test for
inter-rater reliability. Inter-rater agreement in coding random responses was as follows:
for coder estimation of detection probability, Cohen's kappa = .658; for content
identification, Cohen's kappa = .958. Inter-rater intimacy reliability was measured by
comparision of a college graduate's and the experimenter's independent estimations of
living status from 75 randomly selected spouse and parent questionnaires (Cohen's kappa
=

.78).

Missing Data
A total of309 valid excuses were recorded from the 121 participants; 109 excuses
in the work/school context, 105 in the parent context, and 96 in the spouselboy/girlfriend
context. A total of 120 completed self monitoring scores were recorded. Missing and

I

Because of the variable nature of the data, and the fact that some results impact

on subsequent tests, a full discussion of each test will follow immediately after the result.

2 All

tests have a confidence interval of 95%.
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responses included: no excuses given in any contexts (eight community respondents
refused to fill out the context questionnaires after reading the instructions, and one student
participant claimed she had never lied); no excuses in particular contexts (two student
participants claimed they never had occasion to

make excuses to those recipients, five

community respondents noted it was too long ago to recall, and one student said she had
never had a boyfriend). Reasons for invalid responses included: simple denial of
actionlnonaction; use of a context other than specified; no verbal excuse (described an
action only); and telling the truth.
Subject Charateristics: Self Monitoring and Age
The mean age difference between UNF students (M = 25.3) and community
participants (M = 54.0) was found significant using the Mann-Whitney test, chosen
because of normality problems (Z = -7.72, ~ < .001). The difference between mean self
monitoring scores ofUNF students (M
found to be significant (Z = -.2.70,

~

= 7.1) and community participants (M = 9.3) was

= .007), as was the age difference between high self

monitors (M = 26.89 years), defined by a score of 10 and above, and low self monitors
(M = 37.77 years), defined by a score of 9 or below (Z = -3.58,

~

< .001). Results

indicated that UNF students were significantly younger and had lower self monitoring
scores than community participants, and that overall, high monitors were significantly
younger than low monitors. The results of a 2 X 2 ANOVA to test the relationship of
age X area for self monitoring found a main effect for age only (E = 7.67, df: 1, ~ = .007).
In addition, self monitoring scores were found to be significantly negatively correlated
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with age (pearson r = -.355,

Q

< .001). This result suggests self monitoring scores may

not be a static marker reflecting two distinct separate types of self monitoring
personalities, but may be based on the resultant influence of the self monitoring trait and
other variables, such as age, rather than the self monitoring trait alone. The possibility.
arises that with age progression, the scores of some people may change to reflect an
increase in low monitoring behaviors: i.e., with maturity and possibly more confidence in
their own values, their behavior is less influenced by those around them. On the other
hand, the self monitoring scores of young people may be more likely to reflect such high
monitoring behavior concerns as peer acceptance. This speculation would support the
human development theories identifYing the influence of peer pressure on young adult
behavior.
Hypothesis 1. The complexity of an excuse is positively related to the knowledge
level the recipient has about the excuse giver. A repeated measures ANOVA was used to
test Hypotheses 1 and 1a. The three within subject factors were the work, parent, and
spouse/boy/girlfriend contexts; the between subject factors were sex, self monitoring
scores (low, 9 or below; high, over 10), and age (under 40, over 40).
Results ofthe within subjects contrasts (n = 90) showed that'the mean complexity
of excuses in the parent context (M = 4.11) was significantly greater than complexity of
excuses in the work/school context, M

= 3.35 (E = 12.9, df: 2, Q = .001). However, the

complexity of excuses in the spouse/boy/girlfriend context (M

= 3.71) was not

significantly different from the complexity of either the work/school context, M

= 3.35
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Fig.l a. Mean complexity levels for excuses in work, parent, and spouse/boy/girlfriend
contexts.

(E = 3.43, df: 2, Q = ns) or the parent context, M = 4.11 (I: = 3.87, df: 2, Q = ns) (see

Fig.la).
The results suggest that excuses to parents contain more information and are more
complex than excuses to employers/teachers. Hypothesis I is supported for the low
knowledge context (work/school) and the high knowledge context (parent). It is not
supported for the high knowledge context of spouse/boy/girlfriend.
The rationale for this hypothesis assumed that the spouse/boy/girlfriend context
would represent the highest knowledge level of the excuse giver, and thus would result in
a higher mean complexity for the excuse content. A closer look at both relationship
components shows that the two high level knowledge contexts differ in important,
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previously unexamined ways.
First, the relationships serve quite different life purposes, the parent relationship
being one that is imposed on the excuse giver and is generally concerned with providing
nurture and guidance for the developmental years, while the spouselboy/girlfriend
relationship is usually one of choice by the excuse giver and is generally concerned with
social, emotional, and sexual life needs. Second, it is seen that an unequal power
relationship exists between the excuse giver and recipient in the parent context (and
work/school context), but that an egalitarian association is in effect between the excuse
giver and the spouselboy/girlfriend recipient. It can be seen that those individuals in
power, such as an employer, teacher, or parent, are in a position to supply or deny
essential needs, such as financial (or future financial) and physical securities. Thus, there
appears to be a control variable operating in the parent (and work/school) relationship that
is absent in the more egalitarian spouselboy/girlfriend relationships, which may not involve
the basic securities so critically.
Third, because of the broad interpretation of the spouselboy/girlfriend context by
many of the participants, the content of the relationships covered multiple, distinct
associations, which again differed in purpose and intimacy. From the responses to the
questionnaires, eight relationships were identified within the two high knowledge base
contexts. The parent context described two situations, that of participants living with their
parents or living apart from them. The six spouselboy/girlfriend relationships included
those living separately from the participant, such as boy/girl dating, same sex
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Fig.1 b. Mean complexity levels for excuses in work, parent 0, parent 1, spouse 0, and
spouse 1 contexts.
friends, divorcees; and those living with participants, such as married spouses, boy/girl
cohabiting couples, and same sex roommates.
The mean complexities of five context levels, work, parent
parent I (living with), spouse/boy/girlfriend

°

°

(not living with),

(not living with), and spouse/boy/girlfriend

I (living with) were tested following the new interpretation of the context relationships.
Because of unbalanced data, paired t -tests were used instead of a repeated measures
ANOY A to compare the work/school (low knowledge context) with the four high level
knowledge relationship contexts identified as parent 0, parent I, spouse 0, and spouse 1
(see Fig. I b).
Results showed that only the complexity of excuses in the high level knowledge
relationship parent context (parent I) was significantly greater than the complexity of the
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excuses in the low knowledge level work/school context

en = 85, M = .59, ! = 2.69, df:

84, Q = .002). No significant differences in complexity were found for comparisons ofthe
work context to the three other high knowledge level contexts, parent 0

en = 14, M = .00,

! = .00, df: 13, Q = ns), spouse 0 (n = 59, M = -.43, ! = 1.82, df: 58, Q = ns), and spouse 1

en = 34, M = .161,! = .796, df: 33, Q = ns).

Results suggest that only excuses to parents

who live with participants contain more information than excuses to employers/teachers.
Thus, it is concluded that Hypothesis 1 is supported for the low knowledge context
(work/school) and the high knowledge context (living with parents). It is not supported
for the other high knowledge level relationships.
Discussion of the five context complexity results identifies the control factor of
the unequal power relationship as being more important to complexity levels than the
intimacy factor (participants living with or not living with recipients). Of the eight high
knowledge level relationship contexts, only the one involving an unequal power
relationship was significantly different in complexity of excuses from the low knowledge
level work/school context.
The evidence supports the speculation that without the control factor present in a
relationship, the hypothesis of complexity of excuses is not observed. An analogy would

be of drivers on ~ higqway strictly obeying the speed limit when law enforcement officers,
who alsO" ~ve the pOW(fr to threaten the drivers' personal financial/physical security, are
present. However, when the law enforcement personnel are not in evidence, speed laws
tend to be disregarded.
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Hypothesis 1a. The complexity of an excuse is positively related to the self
monitoring score. Tests of between subjects effects from the same repeated measures
ANOVA used to test Hypothesis 1 showed that the variables of sex (E = .025, df: 1, Q =
ns), self monitoring (E = 1.14, df: 1, Q = ns), and age (E = 2.54, df: 1, Q = ns) had no effect
on levels of complexity in this study. The results support the previous study of Millar and

Millar (1995), who found no difference in complexity scores for high or low self monitors.
For this study, it could be suggested that other forces, such as those governing the
security issues, might exert a more powerful effect and may mask influences due to
individual difference characteristics of sex, age, and self monitoring.
Hypothesis 2. The uniqueness of an excuse is Qositively related to the knowledge
level the reciQient has about the excuse giver. The within subjects contrasts test of a
repeated measures ANOVA with the three contexts as within subject factors

CN = 95)

showed that the uniqueness of excuses in the high knowledge level parent context (M =
4.62) is significantly greater than the uniqueness of excuses in the low knowledge level
work context, M

= 4.03 (E = 8.05, df: 1, Q = .006) and the high knowledge level spouse/

boy/girlfriend context, M

= 4.06 (E = 9.47, df= 1, Q = .003) (see Fig.2a). The high

knowledge level spouselboy/girlfriend mean value did not differ significantly from the low
knowledge level work/school context. The results suggest that excuses in the latter
contexts would describe common, more frequently occurring situations, whereas excuses
to parents are more likely to describe unusual, less frequently occurring situations.
Thus Hypothesis 2 is supported for low (work) and high (parent) knowledge
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Fig.2a. Mean uniqueness levels for work, parent, and spouse/boy/girlfriend contexts.

levels. It is not supported for (high) spo use/boy/girlfriend relationships.
The results reflect a similar situation as in Hypothesis 1. The spouse/boy/girlfriend
context again includes the multiple egalitarian relationship factors, the combination of
influences of which may neutralized the uniqueness effects or fail to activate them. A
comparison of the uniqueness levels of the work context to the four high knowledge level
contexts identified by intimacy levels as in Hypothesis 1 was made using paired t-tests
(see Fig.2b).
Results comparing the five contexts showed that uniqueness of excuses in the
living with parent context, parent I, is significantly greater than uniqueness in the work
context (n = 86, M = .57, ! = 3. 17, df: 85 , 12 = .002). No significant differences in
uniqueness of excuses were found comparing the work context to parent 0 (n = 14,
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Fig.2b. Mean uniqueness levels for work, parent 0, parent 1, spouse 0, and spouse 1
contexts.
M = -.003, 1 = .05 , df: 13, Q = ns), spouse 0 (n = 59, M = .15, 1 = .85, df: 58, Q = ns), or
spouse 1 (n = 34, M = -.36, 1 = 1.31 , df: 33 , Q = 115). The results of the five context
comparisons of mean uniqueness suggest that excuses to parents are more likely to
describe unusual, less frequent ly occurring situations, but only if participants are living
with them. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is supported for the low knowledge context (work/school)
and the high knowledge context (living with parents). It is not supported for the other
high knowledge level relationships.
The evidence again shows the parent-living-with context, the only high knowledge
level context that includes an unequal power relationship, is the only high knowledge
context that supports the hypothesis. Parallel to the first hypothesis' results, Hypothesis
2 is supported only in the context sitl\ations that appear to include a contro l variable.
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The intimacy variable is not seen as influential as the control variable, because,
again, the means of the intimate and nonintimate spouselboy/girlfriend contexts, spouse 1
and spouse 0, do not differ significantly from the work context. It is noted from the results
of both Hypotheses 1 and 2 that the highest knowledge context appears to be parent 1
(living with). This is not consistent with the original definition of the high knowledge level
contexts in the method section. There, the parent context was assumed
to represent a moderate knowledge level of the recipient, with spouse/boy/girlfriend
representing the highest knowledge level context. The results of the tests of Hypotheses
1 and 2 suggest that there may be two types of knowledge base, short term (intimate
day to day knowledge) and long term intimacy (knowledge of a person over time).
Parent 1 includes both types of knowledge (possibly the highest knowledge base), while
parent 0 would more likely be restricted to temporal knowledge (possibly the lowest
knowledge base, from the point of view of excuse makers). The relationships included in
the spouse 1 and spouse 0 contexts would appear to combine varying degrees of both
knowledge types.
Hypothesis 3. The frequency of an excuse is negatively related to the knowledge
level the recipient has of the excuse giver. A chi square test of proportion was used to
compare new and old excuse frequencies within the work (low knowledge level), and
parent and spouselboy/girlfriend (high knowledge level) contexts (see Fig.3). Results
showed that a significantly larger proportion of excuses were used before in the work (chi
square = 7.51, df: 1, p

= .006), parent (chi square =

19.04, df: 1, ~ <.001), and
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Fig.3. Frequencies of old and new excuses within the work, parent, and
spouse/boy/girlfriend contexts.

spouse/boy/girlfriend (chi square = 14.45, df: 1, p <. 001) contexts. The evidence does
not support Hypothesis 3; no relationship was found between frequency and knowledge
level. Participants used old excuses more frequently than new excuses in all contexts.
The results support the findings of Hample (1980) that most excuses were
repeated. However, the percentages for this study, 64%, 65%, and 65% for work, parent,
and spouse/boy/girlfriend contexts, respectively, are lower than Hample' s reported 75%.
It is possible that the long term (temporal) intimacy variable may be operating for the high

knowledge level contexts. Because of the length of intimacy over time in many of the high
level knowledge contexts, there may only be a limited amount of new scenarios available,
in which case, old successful excuses would tend to be repeated.
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Hypothesis 4. The frequency of an excuse is negatively related to perceived
deception. The result of the convergent validity test for perceived deception showed
significant differences between the rater and participant agreement for perceived deception
(Fisher's exact test, p < .001). The Cohen kappa agreement measurement (.119) gives
further evidence of negligible agreement. This result shows that ev.en with no possibility
of recipients witnessing the excuse situation, participants were less confident of the
success of the excuse than the rater. This result may be seen to not only emphasize the
difference between laboratory (objective) and real life (subjective) responses for this study,
but might, in addition, provide more evidence for the importance of external validity for
experimental results.
For the ''not identified" condition of perceived deception (see FigAa) in which the
participant did not respond to item (a) of the questionnaire, the resulting test of proportion
for each context's new and old excuses were as follows: work (chi square = 6.0, df: 1, p

= .014), parent (chi square = 9.0, df:
10.7, df: 1, p

1, p

= .003), and spouselboy/girlfriend (chi square =

= .001). The results showed that when success probability was not identified

(28% of excuses in this study), old excuses were used significantly more than new
excuses in all contexts. This indicates that in low/neutral confidence conditions, such as
the ''not identified" condition here, there appears to be more reliance on old excuses than
new. Lessening of confidence appears to decrease the risk taking of new excuses. In
other words, the results support the idea that people tend to rely on old behavior in
uncertain conditions.
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Other Analyses
The relationship of complexity and content categories. The question answered
here was: Do excuses within individual content categories vary in mean complexity? The
mean complexity of each of the six content categories of excuses identified from the
questionnaire excuse statements together with the frequency of each category within the
three contexts is shown in Table 1. The category means were compared using a repeated
measures ANOVA with the three knowledge levels and the six category levels for Factor I
and Factor 2, respectively, of the within subject factor. Results ofthe within subject factor
contrasts showed that the mean complexity level of the relative/friend/other category (M.=
4.29) was significantly greater than the mean complexity levels for illness, M
15.26, df: 1, p < .001), other commitment, M
transportation, M

=

= 2.54 (;t =

= 3.12 (;t = 8.73, df: 1, p = .004),

2.97 (;t = 31.18, df: 1, p < .001), and forget/negligence, M

= 3.05

(;t = 15.28, df: 1, p < .001). Similarly, the mean complexity of the miscellaneous

category (M = 4.14) was significantly greater than the mean complexity levels of
categories for illness (E = 35.68, df: 1, p < .001), other commitment (;t = 29.70, df: 1, p >
.001), transportation (E = 73.73, df: 1, p < .001), and forget/negligence (;t = 40.83, df: 1,
p < .001). Thus, the results show that the relative/friend/other and miscellaneous
categories were both significantly greater in complexity than all other categories, but were
not significantly different in complexity from each other (E = 2.8, df: 1, p

= ns); they were

both identified as "complex" in nature. All other categories were identified as "simple" in
nature (see Table 1).
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Table 1
Frequencies of Excuse Categories within Work/School Parent/Guardian. and
SpouselBoylGirlfriend Contexts
Content

Complexity

Category

(mean)

Excuse

Total

Frequency

Nature

Work

Parent

Spouse

Relative/friend

4.29

Complex

19

30

21

70

Illness(a)

2.54

Simple

42*

2

8

52

Other commitment(b) 3.12

Simple

12

14

26*

52

Transportation(c)

2.97

Simple

13*

3

3

19

Forget/negligence

3.05

Simple

9

6

7

22

Miscellaneous(d)

4.l4

Complex

13

50*

31

94

108

105

96

309

Total

* Denotes context with significantly greater excuse frequency within that content
category: (a) R < .001; (b) R

= .024;

(c) R = .004; (d) R < .001.

The relationshiR of frequency of excuse categories and the knowledge level the
reciRient has of the excuse giver. The question answered here was: Does the frequency of
excuse categories vary according to the context? Table 1 shows the distribution of
excuses within each content category for three contexts. The Cochrane test for
dichotomous related variables was used to compare excuse frequencies of each category
within the low knowledge level (work) and high knowledge level (parent and
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spouselboy/girlfriend) contexts. Significant differences were found within the illness
(Cochrane's Q = 58.17, df: 2, R < .001), other commitment (Cochrane's Q = 7.47, df: 2, R
=

.024), transportation (Cochrane's Q = 11.11, df: 2, R = .004), and miscellaneous

(Cochrane's Q = 28.14, df: 2, R < .001) categories.
As the relative/friend/other and miscellaneous categories had been identified as

complex in nature, more excuses will be expected within the high knowledge level
contexts in support of Hypothesis 1. From Table 1, it is seen that although the parent
context has the greatest frequency of excuses in the relative/friend/other category, the
difference within the three contexts is not significant (Cochrane's Q = 4.04, df: 2, R = ns).
However, this category of excuse assumes a significant position in each of the three
recipient contexts, being the second most frequently used excuse in the work (17%) and
parent (28%) contexts, and third most frequently used excuse in the spouselboy/girlfriend
context (21 %).
In discussing these results, it is suggested that, although the most influential factor
for this trend might be that excuses involving relative/friends/others would be difficult to
challenge within any context, to be accepted in the work/school context, the excuse
situation would need to describe scenarios which clearly take precedence over immediate
school or work responsibilities. Examination of the written excuse statements in the
relative/friends/others category for the work/school context showed that of the excuses
that appeared to meet this requirement, 53% involved emergency or terminal health
situations to close relatives (three infant daughters, two sisters, one mother, one
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grandmother, and one wife). The exclusive use of one gender in such excuses is note
worthy, and suggests that the excuse makers felt recipients would be more accepting of
situations featuring emergencies to females.
The results of the frequency contrasts of the miscellaneous category support
Hypothesis 1 (Cochrane's Q = 28.14, df: 2,12 < .001). Significantly more excuses were
recorded for both high knowledge level contexts of parent (53% oftotal excuses in the
miscellaneous category) and spouselboy/girlfriend (32%) compared to the low knowledge
level work context (14%). The miscellaneous category accounted for the highest
frequency of excuses within the parent (48%) and spouse (32%) contexts. A practical
explanation suggests that although miscellaneous excuses might be difficult to detect as
untrue in any context, they may also be less likely to be acceptable within the work/school
context for similar reasons to those in the relative/friend/other category. For example, one
miscellaneous excuse to a spouse for not arriving home on time was that the participant
''fell asleep in the car" after a drinking spree. Although accepted by his wife, it is unlikely
that this same excuse would be accepted by his employer for not arriving to work on time.
The illness, other commitment, transportation, and forget/negligence categories
have been identified as simple in nature, and more excuses would be expected within the
low knowledge level context in support of Hypothesis 1. Results of frequency
contrasts in the illness category supported the hypothesis (Cochrane's Q = 58.17, df: 2,
IL< .001). Illness was used significantly more as an excuse when the recipients were
employers or teachers (80% of excuses in this category) and significantly less for either
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parents (4%) or spouse/girVboyfriends (15%). In this case, it is not difficult to see that
the excuse simply would not "work" as well in the closer relationship area because parents
and significant others who live with the excuse maker would be more likely to know
his/her true state of health at any time, and any lie would be easily detected.
Results of the other commitment/work/study content category contrasts did not
support Hypothesis 1 (Cochrane's Q = 7.47, df: 2, n = .024). In fact, significantly more
excuses (50% in this category) were recorded for the high knowledge level spouse
context, with 23% and 27% of excuses recorded for the work/school and parent contexts,
respectively. It is note worthy that an excuse involving an other commitment/work/study
was regarded by excuse makers as a significantly more desirable excuse for the egalitarian
relationship context (spouselboy/girlfriend), and significantly less desirable for the
unequal power relationships of work/school and parent contexts. In effect, the result
suggests that excuse makers would be more concerned with offending those in power
(which might possibly involve a threat to their essential securities) by inferring that other
commitments might take precedence over those of the recipients. In contrast, other
commitment/work/study excuses to the egalitarian spouselboy/girl relationships would be
more likely to succeed, particularly when the excuse involved other commitments
to work or school, which would be considered an acceptable priority over most
spouselboy/girlfriend issues.
The frequency of excuses in the transportation category supported Hypothesis 1
(Cochrane's Q = 11.11, df: 2,

n = .004).

The transportation category was used
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significantly more when the recipient was an employer or teacher (68% of category), than
either a parent (16%) or a spouselboy/girlfriend (16%). As a practical explanation for
these results, it can be seen that the chances of a spouse, significant other, or parent living
with the participant discovering the truth (and uncovering the lie) would be relatively high,
as they would already be in an informed position regarding any likely transportation
situations of the excuse maker. In the case ofworklschool associates (or parents who do
not live with the recipient), intimate details of the excuse giver are not usually available,
and the transportation excuse could be given with more confidence.
Resuhs of frequency distribution in the forget/negligence category did not support
Hypothesis 1 (Cochrane's Q = .70, df: 2, 12 = ns). This category was the least used ofall
the six categories (7% ofthe overall total excuses), comprising 8%, 6%, and 7% ofthe
total excuses recorded for the work, parent, and spouselboy/girlfriend contexts,
respectively. A subjective explanation for this result suggests that although the excuse
may be "successful" in sense that it would be believed, it may not be accepted: the
consequences ofthe excuse may be just as damaging as the consequences of the truth (i.e.,
in both cases the relationship might be threatened, possibly precipitating undesirable
consequences). Thus, excuse makers appear to consider admitting to forgetfulness or
negligence in any context area to be of limited success value (accounting for less than 10%
of excuses in any context). A possible theoretical explanation of the low response may lie
within the attribution theory. The excuses in this category do not appear to meet the
requirements of the attribution theory, in that they describe situations that are internal and

Deception in Interpersonal Settings 44

controllable to the excuse maker. This result would support the feeling of Weiner and his
collaborators that excuse situations need to decrease inferences of personal responsibility,
i.e., to reflect external and uncontrollable scenarios, in order to meet excuse goal
requirements. This same problem of attnbution may apply to the other commitment/work
category results, where again, there were no significant frequency differences between the
low knowledge level (work) and high knowledge level (parent) contexts.
Thus, one theoretical explanation for the pattern of the results shown in Table 1 is
that a necessary condition for demonstration of the complexity hypotheses is that excuses
might first need to meet the attnbution requirements of being external and uncontrollable.
Subjectively, however, excuse categories appear to be chosen for two reasons (a) how
likely they are to remain undetected, and (b) whether that particular type of excuse would
be accepted by the recipient. In effect, the frequency pattern seems to suggest that
excuses in a particular content category were regarded by excuse givers as a clearly
desirable or undesirable choice for that recipient.

The relationship of the nature of excuses and the knowledge level the recipient has
about-the-excuse giver. The question t-o be answered here was: Do the nature of excuses,
whether they are cotnp1ex or simple, vary with the context? Results of chi square tests of
proportions for fr-equencies of simple and complex excuses within the work context,
representing "low knowledge "level of the recipient, and parent and spouse/boy/girlfriend
contexts, representing the high knowledge level of the recipient, are shown in Table 2.
For the low level knowledge level context (work), simple excuses were used
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Table 2
Comparison of Simple and Complex Excuse Freguencies within Three· Contexts

Context

Excuse Freguencies
Simple

Complex

Work

76

32

<R < .001)

Parent

25

80

Ul< .001)

Spouse

43

53

<R = .414)

144

165

Total

significantly more than complex excuses (chi square = 17.92, df: 1, P < .001). For the
high knowledge level context (parent), complex excuses were used significantly more
than simple excuses (chi square = 28.81, df: 1, p

= < .001). There was no significant

difference in the use of simple or complex excuses in the high knowledge level
spouselboy/girlfriend context (chi square = .66, df: 1, p

= ns). Thus, excuses to employers

or teachers are more likely to be simple in nature, excuses to parents are more likely to be
complex in nature, but excuses to other relationships are as likely to be simple as complex.
The results of the work and parent contexts support the complexity hypothesis in that
excuses more complex in nature would be more likely to be used in the high knowledge
contexts, and those more simple in nature would be more likely to be used in the low
knowledge level context. The results of the spouselboy/girlfriend context do not support
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Table 3
Comparison of Simple and Complex Excuse Frequencies within Five Contexts

Context

Excuse Frequency
Simple Complex

Work

76

32

(p < .001)

Parent 0

8

13

(p = .275)

Parent 1

17

67

Spouse 0

22

37

(p = .423)

Spouse 1

21

16

(p = .752)

144

165

Total

m< .001)

the complexity hypothesis.
Further investigation reveals the same situation as seen in the complexity and
uniqueness hypotheses. The spouse context again includes egalitarian multiple
relationship factors which may similarly neutralize the effects of complexity issues and
thus the tendency to use either simple or complex natured excuses. Table 3 shows results
of chi square tests of proportion for five contexts including the intimacy levels previously
identified as work, parent 1, parent 0, spouse 1, and spouse O.
Parent 1 (living with participant) was again the only high knowledge level context
to indicate significantly higher use of complex excuses (chi square = 29.76, df: 1, P <
.001). No significance was found for tests for parent 0 (chi square = 1.19, df: 1, p = ns),
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spouse 0 (chi square = .64, df: 1, :Q = ns), and spouse 1 (chi square = .10, df: 1,:Q = ns).
Thus, excuses to employers and teachers are more likely to be simple in nature, excuses to
parents are more likely to be complex only when participants live with them, and excuses
to recipients in all other relationships are as equally likely to be simple as complex.
It is noted that parent 1 is, again, the only high knowledge level context that
represents an unequal power relationship. The intimacy factor was not considered as
influential, because neither spouse I nor spouse 0 relationships differed with regard to
proportion of simple or complex excuse use. The evidence again supports the speculation
that without the control factor present in a relationship, excuse givers use both simple and
complex excuses to the same degree.
The relationshi:Q of success of an excuse to the knowledge level the reci:Qient
has about the excuse maker. The question posed for this examination ofthe data was,
"Do excuses vary in success rates within the work, parent, spouselboy/girlfriend
contexts?" A comparison of successful and unsuccessful excuses for the three contexts
was carried out using the McNemar test for nonparametric related dichotomous data.
Results showed that excuses in the work/school context are significantly more successful
than excuses in the parent (:Q = .001) or spouselboy/girlfriend context (:Q = .021). There
was no significant difference between success rates comparing the parent and
spouselboy/girlfriend contexts (:Q = ns). More excuses failed to parents (13%) than
to spouselboyfriends/girlfriends (11 %) or employers/teachers (2%). Thus, excuses
to employers/teachers appear to be more successful than excuses to parents or to
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spouselboy/girlfriends. Excuses appeared to be equally as successful to parents as to
spouselboy/girlfriends. The results also suggest that there may be a negative relationship
between success of an excuse and knowledge level of the recipient, in that excuses in low
knowledge level (work or school) contexts appear to be more successful than excuses in
the high level knowledge (parent or spouselboy/girlfriend) contexts.
An explanation for these results may lie in the fact that because the work contex
is the lowest knowledge base, and possibly of the least temporal duration, recipients are
less likely to know the true situation of the excuse giver. In addition, more effort and
thought may go into excuse preparation, because serious consequences might result in
their failure within this context (termination of relationship, getting fired from the job,
loss or failure of grade in schoo1, etc.). On the other hand, failure of excuses in the
parent or spouselboy/girlfriend relationship may be less likely to result in such
irrevocable situations, even though negative consequences could result; a "forgiveness"
principle might be operating in these cases, particularly if the relationship is a good one,
otherwise.
The relationship of success of an excuse and frequency of use. The question posed
for this analysis was: "Are previously used excuses more successful than new excuses?" A
chi square test of proportion for new and old successful excuses was carried out for each
of the three contexts of work, parent, and spouselboy/girlfriend. The results showed that
previously used excuses were significantly more successful than new excuses in the
work (chi square = 8.9, df: 1, P = .003), parent (chi square = 20.28, df: 1, p < .001), and
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spouse/boy/girlfriend (chi square = 12.93, df: 1, Q < .001) contexts. Thus, previously used
excuses tend to be more successful and used more often regardless of the recipient.
The result of this analysis may reflect the pragmatic reason for the choice of
specific excuses, following the operant conditioning principle of behavioral science, that
rewarded behavior will be repeated. The two excuses that failed in the work/school
context had a complexity mean of7.0, compared to the complexity mean of successful
excuses in this context of 3.3 7. This supports the complexity hypotheses in that excuses in
the work/school context (low knowledge level) need to contain a minimum of information
to be successful. However, subjectively, the excuse makers would have only been aware
that the excuses in these instances had failed. That the complexity hypotheses may also be
in effect would be of little concern to them. In other words, subjective trial and error,

i.e.~

whether specific excuses were successful or not would determine their future use, rather
than objective reasoning based on theoretical complexity issues.
Conclusion
This study has investigated the nature of excuses, including estimations of excuse

complexity, uniqueness, frequency, and success. Particular emphasis has been given to the
changes in such characteristics within different contexts distinguished by the level of
knowledge the recipient has about the excuse giver.
Evidence has been found that the complexity and uniqueness of excuses vary
positively with the knowledge level of the recipient when an unequal power relationship
exists between the recipient and the excuse giver. Data analysis showed that excuses to
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recipients with a low personal knowledge level of the excuse giver, such as employers or
teachers, tended to be simple in nature, contain a minimum amount of information, and
were usually common and frequently occurring. In contrast, excuses to recipients with a
high personal knowledge of the excuse giver, such as parents who lived with the
participants, tended to be complex in nature, contained significantly larger amounts of
information, were generally more specific to the excuse giver and less frequently
occurring. The present study supports Lippard's (1988) conclusions that relationship
variables are key factors in deceptive communication.
Hample (1980) identified the unequal power relation of excuse makers to parent
or achievement contexts from the point of view that the recipients in these categories were
the individuals deceived most frequently. Lippard also identified power as an important
variable for excuse making with the goal of moderating or mitigating the control of those
in power. Her findings are reflected in this study where the purpose of most of the excuses
to employers or teachers appeared to be directed to avoiding work or school related
responsibilities, such as not going to work or delaying school assignments or tests, and the
purpose of many excuses to parents involved clandestine encounters with
non-parent-approved friends of the opposite sex. Lippard also recognized the parent
context as exerting the most control over the lives of excuse givers. In the present study,
parents living with participants were identified as probably having the highest personal
knowledge level of excuse givers, with information based on both immediate day to day
and long term (temporal) intimacy.

Deception in Interpersonal Settings 51
No relationship was found for complexity and uniqueness of excuses for egalitarian
relationships between recipient and excuse giver, despite that fact that all relationships
identified in the work ofMcCornack and Parks (1986) and Millar and Millar (1995),
which fonned much of the theoretical basis of the present study, were egalitarian and none
of an unequal power structure. The difference in the responses in the present study may be
a reflection of the obvious contrast in methodology and focus. In the Millar and Millar
experiment, the responses for recipients' detection of untrue objective statements in two
personal relationships, friends and strangers, were compared in an experimental setting. In
contrast, the present correlational study measures excuse givers' responses for real life
deception issues within two professional and eight personal relationships (which did not
include strangers).
Frequency analysis showed that old excuses were used more than new excuses in
all contexts, which supported the findings of Hample (1980) that most excuses had been
used before. Previously used excuses were also found to be more frequent in low or
neutral confidence conditions, and were more likely to be successful. In addition, excuses
were more successful to employers or teachers than to parents or spouselboy/girlfriends.
Examination of the mean complexity of excuses in individual content categories
identified two categories as "complex" in nature, and four as "simple" in nature. In
support of the main complexity hypothesis, excuses to employers or teachers were more
likely to be from categories identified as simple in nature, excuses to parents were more
likely to be from categories identified as complex in nature. However, excuses to
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spouselboy/girlfriends were as likely to be simple as complex in nature. The absence of
the unequal power relationship for this context is again suggested as a reason for this
anomaly.
Complexity analysis for the six content categories showed different categories of
excuses emerging for different recipients of the excuses. Illness accounted for the greatest
number of excuses for employers or teachers (39% of all excuses to employers or
teachers), whereas the miscellaneous category was used most for parents and
spouselboy/girlfriends (48% and 32% ofall excuses in the respective contexts). The
majority use of the simple category (illness) for the low knowledge level context of
work/school and the majority use for the complex category (miscellaneous) for the high
knowledge contexts of parent and spouselboy/girlfriend also supports the main complexity
hypotheses of this study.
Tests of between subject effects of the repeated measures ANOVA which
compared complexity within the three contexts, showed that the variables of sex, self
monitoring, and age had no effect on the levels of complexity for this study. However, in
a separate analysis, a strong negative relationship was found for self monitoring with age.
The results of this study support those of the Millar and Millar experiment, which reported
no effects of self monitoring on information levels of excuses.
Strengths of the Study
The approach of this study has weighed the theories of more than one
psychological discipline in explaining the nature of excuses, and has thereby possibly
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increased their power of prediction by recogillzing the contribution of research from more
than one source. Results from cognitive psychology experiments on detection
investigating information levels of excuses have been applied to findings of correlational
studies on content and context of excuse deception in social psychology settings; the
motivation/drive theories of developmental psychology have been proposed to explain
differences in responses in egalitarian and unequal power relationships; finally the
behavioral science theory of operant conditioning has been suggested for participants'
pragmatic reasons for choice of excuses.
The study has the external validity advantages of a correlational study in a field
setting with the influence of real life factors, together with experimental dimensions
provided by manipUlation of recipient conditions and selection of different types of
participants. The importance of external validity has been demonstrated by significant
differences in responses to perceived deception judgments by coders and participants, and
by the recognition of the influence of the unequal power relationship on the content of
excuses in real life settings not previously recognized in laboratory experiments on
information levels. Discussion of results has acknowledged that responses in real life
appear to be the resultant of more than one force or influence. The present design and
procedures adapted from previous correlation studies (Lippard, 1988; Weiner et al. 1991)
have thus resolved some of the problems formerly identified by reviewers concerning
deception experiments. They included such strategies as using personal rather than
impersonal relationships, a focus on the recipient as well as on the excuse giver, and
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interactive roles in an experimental setting for deceivers and recipients who are known to
each other and are concerned with the results of the deception behavior. In this way, the
design has considered the dynamic relationship between participants and enabled the
complexity and motivation of excuses to be examined and measured. The results have
particularly emphasized the singular effect of the control factor in human interaction, the
influence of which may be important in other areas of social psychology.
Limitations of the Study
The correlational design limits the study's usefulness in that it is unlikely that all
factors that could have an influence on the complexity and nature of excuses have been
identified. Additional variables might emerge from a replication study using a design
suitable for a more powerful analysis, such as multiple regression techniques. This could
be accomplished with a larger subject base and broader demographic information to
include as many additional influences that could affect the nature of excuse, including
quantified degrees of short and long term intimacy, time length of relationship, degree of
quality of the relationship, exact age ofparticipantlrecipient at the time of the excuse,
social and economic background details, etc., as examples. The importance of intimacy
influences were detected in the present study, but were only able to be estimated
subjectively from participants' descriptive statements. In addition, all dependent measures
and most independent measures were developed for this study, so that internal validity and
consistency cannot be assumed. Standardization of measures with replication could
address this problem. Finally, participants' descriptions of excuses were based on
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memories of events, which may have been altered over time, repressed, or forgotten
entirely. Against this fact is that many of the events were emotionally charged, actively
involved the participants, so most may have been recalled with acceptable accuracy.
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Appendix A
University of North Florida Student Informed Consent Form
Principal Investigator

Vera Trefry
Department of Psychology

Project Title:

Social Communiction Strategies:
Considerations of Content and Context

Description of Study: You are asked to complete four questionnaires and one
demographics form. Three pages of the questionnaires relate to past experiences when
you are asked to recall giving excuses on occasions concerning your (1) spouse, girlfriend,
or boyfriend, (2) work or school, and (3) parents or guardians. Questionnaires are
identified by numbered code only, and all responses are anonymous. Time will be
provided for answering any questions you may have concerning the questionnaires after
you have read instructions. Agreement to participate in this study will earn you extra
credit as stipulated by your course instructor. However, you are free to withdraw your
consent and discontinue the completion of the questionnaires at any time without incurring
penalty. The questionnaires should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.
I have read and I understand the procedures described above. I agree to participate in the
study and I have received a copy of this informed consent.

Participant

Date

Principal Investigator

Date

Witness

Date
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AppendixB
Community Informed Consent Form

Principal Investigator

Vera Trefry
Department of Psychology

Project Title:

Social Communication Strategies:
Considerations of Content and Context

Description of Study: You are asked to complete four questionnaires and one
demographics form. Three pages of the questionnaires relate to past experiences when
you are asked to recall giving excuses on occasions concerning your (1) spouse, girlfriend,
or boyfriend, (2) work or schoo~ and (3) parents or guardians. Questionnaires are
identified by numbered code only, and all responses are anonymous. The questionnaires
should take approximately 15 minutes to complete.
Please return the completed material in the stamped address envelope provided.
Your willingness to participate in this important study is warmly appreciated.

Principal Investigator

Date
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Appendix C
Demographic Data
Code

0000

Please provide the following information:
SEX

Male_ __

Female

---

AGE
STUDENT STATUS

full time

EMPLOYMENT STATUS

full time

part time_ __

none- - -

part time _ __

retired - - -

full time homemaker- - -
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AppendixD
Self Monitoring Questionnaire (Snyder, 1974)

Survey instrument deleted, paper copy available upon request.
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